Excellent!

Posted by: William Boggess at August 12, 2005 12:22 PM

Clear and concise. Truely a great read.

Posted by: mikeM at August 12, 2005 02:38 PM

Great read. Kissinger is always worth listening to. You have to check out this post (http://www.spectator.org/dsp_article.asp?art_id=8567) on American Spectator regarding progress, or lack thereof, on the infrastructure in Iraq. It appears that our work is facing terminal delays due to "bureaucracy". I just wonder where the roadblocks are really coming from. Could opponents of this war be stonewalling progress on the rebuilding of infrastructure just to delay progress? I would really like to read your take on this.

Posted by: Sammy's Boy at August 12, 2005 08:47 PM

The Spectator article mentioned above throws a whole new light on the subject. Shocking. The thought of losing the war simply through bureaucratic mis(mal)feasance is both infuriating and demoralizing.

Posted by: Paul at August 12, 2005 09:37 PM

It's really essential that the infrastructure get built. That is key to having success in Iraq. Unfortunately, the public is never going to get as excited over roads, powerplants, and schools as they do over guns, tanks, and planes, thus leaving the politicians with little incentive for funding them.

Posted by: William at August 12, 2005 11:42 PM

Paul & William,
You're observations are correct, but you are missing the larger point. This administration has pissed off the lifetime staffers at State Dept., and the CIA. I think that there is a strong likelihood that this holdup in spending (funding is there the money is not being spent) is being "blocked" by one or both of these entities to fight back at this administration due to its attempt to clean house.
Don't get distracted by the obvious, there is a root cause. Funding is there, RFPs were requested, something/someone is holding up approval of the RFPs and spending of the existing funds.
What better way to hold the president hostage?

Posted by: Sammy's Boy at August 13, 2005 06:47 AM

According to State's quarterly report Congress on Iraq reconstruction, the change of government in Iraq was a major contributor to delays during the past quarter(emphasis mine):

Working with a New Government

With the establishment of the Iraqi Interim Government in June 2004, Iraqi Ministries became full partners in reconstruction and development planning. The planning culminated with the successful conduct of elections in January [2005], which led to the establishment of the Transitional National Assembly (TNA), the first legislative body to directly result from free and fair public elections. Subsequent careful, deliberate and time-consuming consideration by the TNA during this quarter led to the formation of the Iraqi Transitional Government (ITG) in May [2005].

The time spent in forming the ITG delayed decisions, large and small, regarding the implementation of IRRF projects by the ITG ministries on various projects. The transition also made it difficult for some ministries to access their capital budgets through the Iraqi Ministry of Finance. These delays, however, were a necessary price to pay for considerable progress in the development of Iraq’s capacity to govern itself. In the process, Iraqis gained greater confidence in the continuity of essential governmental functions despite change in the political leadership.

Since being sworn in, the ITG has taken greater ownership and responsibility for all aspects of the reconstruction agenda, including overall policy and security. Several ministries have appointed resident engineers to provide on-site supervision of reconstruction projects. They have helped draft contracts and made available their approved contractor lists. IRRF projects have been sub-contracted to more Iraq contractors. Contracts have been modified to allow work to be done by Ministry employees and contractors with IRRF-acquired supplies, which has helped foster a better understanding among Iraqis of the construction process and the need for subsequent maintenance. For example, USAID electrical distribution projects in Baghdad were all implemented by Ministry employees with US- provided parts and equipment.

The ITG articulated Iraq’s strategic vision for national development in Brussels in June, and continues to refine its National Development Strategy. We anticipate working with the ITG and its Ministries to continue to adapt our efforts to the emerging Iraqi vision and aid in the realization of their strategic goals through our efforts in coordination with other nations and organizations.

Being State, they're too diplomatic to do anything other than try to put a positive spin on it; but it essentially shoehorned another (possibly inexperienced and highly political) bureaucratic layer into the process.

Walsh wrote (emphasis mine):

I have been absolutely baffled by the apparent paralysis that afflicts the bureaucracy dealing with the RFP's. The men and women who work there (both civilian and military) seem to be intelligent, dedicated, loyal, and hard-working. Nevertheless, government entities charged with responding to RFP's such as the Army Corps of Engineers (ACE) and the Project Contracting Office (PCO), appear unable to overcome the mysterious blockage that prevents them from making the critical decision to award a project. Awarding a project is the first step on the road to getting it executed.

I suspect Waslh's "mysterious blockage" may be the ITG and the various Ministries.

Posted by: Lynxx Pherrett at August 13, 2005 12:03 PM

Sounds like a good process, but it requires two things (which may already be in place). One, heavy US pressure to get things done. Two, a thorough US oversight to insure that people aren't merely stuffing their own pockets once given the money.

Eventually, the Iraqi's should have a judicial branch to provide the oversight and a strong media to provide the pressure, but while the institutions are lacking and security is the top issue, it's our job to look to the long term.

Posted by: William at August 13, 2005 05:35 PM

Henry continues to lie. He says. "Despite such handicaps, the decision to replace U.S. forces with local armies during the Vietnam War -- labeled "Vietnamization" -- was, from the security viewpoint, successful on the whole."? What!
Have you looked at a map dated 1975 or later. Find Saigon! It was a failure. "Peace with Honor" as worse than "Peace in Our Times". It was undonditional surrender.
As soon as we left Ho took over. It was unconditonal surrender. Goldwater and Ronnie said as much.
Henry and Jimmy Carter both seem to live on another planet where reality does not exist.

Posted by: Rod Stanton at August 14, 2005 05:20 AM

For these reasons, a withdrawal schedule should be accompanied by some political initiative inviting an international framework for Iraq's future.

[pausing to scream and curse]

When was the last time the world saw a successful international framework in the form of something other than the sort of military presence that would be withdrawing from Iraq?

Vietnam failed because a) we did not leave behind the sort of deterrent we left in South Korea, and b) we didn't consider the alternative to a deterrent - actually invading North Vietnam and taking out its government. Not a whole lot of miles between the shores of Haiphong and Hanoi. We should have done it in 1967 when NV attacked the South - and us. I bet fewer lives would have been lost if we'd fought a war like an actual war. Even a stalemate like what we managed in Korea would be preferable to handing South Vietnam over to the Commies on a silver platter.

Did Kissinger ever have a diplomatic success? (Treaties with the USSR that the USSR broke don't count.) Just curious.

Posted by: Alan K. Henderson at August 15, 2005 01:20 AM