Part of the delay, clearly, has been weather related. You probably didn't have that programmed into the simulation, since the sandstorms had relatively little impact during Desert Storm.

Two other things strike me. One, I think the plan was to hae another heavy division coming in from Turkey. The lack of cooperation from our erstwhile ally means those troops are now still making their way to the theater.

Second, and the one that really baffles me, is the limited use of airpower in this strategy. When our mission was simply to drive Saddam's forces out of Kuwait, we had a six week air campaign. But the time ground pounders went in, the Iraqis couldn't wait to surrender. Now, with a much more difficult mission, we did a couple hours of bombing and then immediately started having our land forces move in.

I don't know if the latter was a function of us thinking we might have gotten Saddam that first night or whether that was the plan to begin with. But it certainly vexes me.

Steven-

The biggest miscalculation was Turkey. If we had stopped dicking with them sooner, we would have been able to put the 4ID in on-time from Kuwait. That would have drastically changed our position now. Also having the air from the north would have been nice to spread the load around. The ratio of flight time to weapon delivery must be really high right now. We could be flying much faster cycles if we had Turkey on board.

But, we don't. However, I don't think this delay will play a significant part in the total operation. As we start using these air bases in Iraq that we have recently captured, that will help replentishment and CAS immeasureably.

Strategically, I think time is on our side. Tactically, it may seem like it is not, but Saddam is in much worse shape than we are right now.

TO: All
RE: Why So Long

Too few people appreciate the logistics of moving and fighting a heavy corps. I don't care about weather or the enemy, particularly THIS enemy, so much as I do about getting the troops the equipment and supplies they need.

A heavy corps, rather a complete heavy corps with the currently missing armored cavalry regiment, can take these guys. Especially with all the bells and whistles units like SF, Rangers, CAS, etc.

However in order to take them they need a steady supply of fuel, ammo, and everything else.

The race across the desert by 3ID has been breath-taking....LITERALLY SO.

Now they are outside of range of enemy ground based tube-type artillary and catching their breath....and building their logistical base.

Wargames, by and large, are very nice, but I've yet to see one that REALLY addresses the logistical issues accurately.

SPI's The Next War, hypothesizing WWIII in Europe circa '80s, did a fair job with it, but only in the fact that if a unit could not trace a line of so-many hexes back to a unblocked road to an unblocked railline, the unit's combat effectiveness and movement was halved.

Even now, there are reports that engineer units are scrambling about for clay and rock....three guesses as to what they are planning to build next....airfields so that we can land logistical supplies directly behind 3ID, instead of running along that long highway from Kuwait.

Stephen...that game is good, but I'm not familiar with how it addresses logistics.

Regards,

Chuck(le)
[Amateurs study tactics. Professional soldiers study logistics.]

Certainly true on the logistics, Chuck. And our strategic lift capability has been just woeful for decades.

I did hear a report somewhere the last couple of days--NPR, I think--that we're getting a lot more efficient because we're operating the supply chain using the model of FedEx and others. Still, that doesn't help move an M1 tank that barely fits into a C-5, which most runways in the 3rd World can't land anyway.

TO: James
RE: Logistics Carrying Capabilities

Strategically, the C17 was designed specifically to carry an MBT. That's a big help, but there are never enough of the log carriers around...or so it seems.

Battles, especially modern ones, are won or lost on the backs of 40T and 12T stake and platform trailers and 5000 gallon fuel tankers, and the tractors that pull them.

Like young Captain Sharpe, not appreciating having to do logistics work when all the glory is in the battle line, complaining about having to work 'lists' [of supplies] to Wellington's staff officer and the officer rebuking him telling him that wars are won with such lists. Without supplies the guys on the front line would be dead heros.

I'm thinking it will take about a week to build up the supplies to support a major attack on Baghdad proper. In the meantime, the fly-boys and sneaky petes can have fun. Furthermore, it would probably be a very good idea to get 1ID and 4ID in position too.

Regards,

Chuck(le)

P.S. In my opinion, a heavy corps should consist of 3 heavy divisions, an armored cavalry regiment, and all the 'trimmings'; Rangers, SF, CAS, naval, marines, strategic bombing, some airborne. some airmobile and, of course, the loggie doggies.

P.P.S. I would dearly like to see the logistic annexes of the 3ID orders.

One question about your analysis, was it able to take into account the fact that Iraq has very little in the way of a real army, instead having opted to resort immediately to guerilla tactics?

They're going out like real bastards, and they're playing to our greatest weakness, which is our aversion to collateral damage. Americans like the showdown at noon, where everyone else clears out while the gunfighters go at it, man to man. Unfortunately, I don't think they're going to give us the pleasure. Fucking bastards.

You're not the only one dude. I heard Gen. Mcaffery (sp??) last night say that Rummy's original plan involved just TWO BRIGADES of ground forces. Franks managed to talk him into what they've got but wanted a lot more.

You'd think someone could have predicted all this guerilla stuff going on. Maybe someone did and they didn't want to hear it.

Turkey screwed us royally as well.

I wonder anoter big part of the reason it's taking longer than you anticipated is that we're going to ridiculous (and in my view, ultimately immoral and counterproductive) lengths to avoid Iraqi civilian -- and even Iraqi military, in some cases -- casualties.

Of course, this is related to our decreased use of air power, mentioned above.

True, Rumsfeld and the neos along with Stephen were overly optimistic with respect to troop estimates, but I concur with Mike and Chuck with regards to logistics & Turkey. Wesley Clarke made the point opposite Ralph Peters last night that the logistical/deployment pipeline got waylaid in the eastern Mediterranean more than anything else. The fact is you can only squeeze through so much so fast thru the Kuwaiti bottleneck. Aside from Turkey, the major new variable introduced has been the brownshirt tactics of Saddam. Strategypage has an apt comparison to the Russian's motivational techniques in Stalingrad, and I might add the SS' in 1945 Germany. However, there is a political downside to these tactics once they lose. In any case, the only question now is whether to push things now, or wait out the 2-3 weeks of political heat until the 4th ID arrives. Now that the RG positions are effectively fixed, I would say its about time for some maneuver and the aerial pounding James is eager for. Better though, to have pushed into Iraq with what we've got and make logistical room for the followup while we do some close in aerial pounding and fedayeen sniping while we keep out of artillery range of the chems. Remember- friction of war. So far so good.

It should be remembered that it's easier to supply a small force than a large one. Supplying the 3rd and the 4th Infantry divisions via the one main highway between Kuwait and Baghdad would have been a major pain in the butt. That's probably why we put up with Turkey's waffling on the issue of launching a ground assault from their territory.

Turkey's betrayal put a major crimp in our plans, and probably added weeks to the length of the war. There needs to be some payback for that.

Riyadh delenda est!

We probably are on plan. If you look at what we've done, we've basically run up from the border to the edge of the "zone of control" (to use wargame parlance) of the Iraqi units which are actually capable of opposing us. Now we can consolidate our rear, bomb the units in front, confident that the enemy isn't going to start wandering around on us. I suspect we'll need 4th to finish the job. The rest of the incoming troops are probably relief for the currently in-theatre units, rather than proper reinforcements expected to be needed for the fight. We did this march forward, and then will take a break while bombing, rather than do this run up later and immediately try a ground attack on the main formations. Forced march, rest, attack works much better than forced march, attack, rest, unless your name is T.J. Jackson.

I'm trying to withold judgement 'til there's more of a historical record. Though I will say I'm concerned in general with Rumsfeld's approach to Army reform (see for example the "Team Trackless" work over at strategypage re: Stryker vehicles), as I say, while I'm concerned with that general approach, I think it's too soon to pass judgement on this ongoing campaign. Too much we don't know yet.

The logistic/tactics point is well taken - but no to the detriment of good tactics, and I -do- have a tactical concern. Some of the footage and pictures I've seen shows civilians (?) walking through US units. This is pretty poor security. I'm failing to understand why we're not warning and keeping civilians away from US units, especially along logistics routes. Seems if they were excluded at least as far as RPG/AK range, there'd be a lot more safety for convoys. Announce with leaflets, radio, PA systems, sign/ribbon the exclusion area.

Interested in comments on the idea. Goes back for me to one of the lessons in "Duffer's Drift," about security concerns regarding civilians observing (and reporting to the enemy) one's tactical dispositions.

RE: FedEx logistics

The Army's attempt to move more towards a 'just in time' log chain is another factor in what's slowing us down now. The M1 is a great tank, but it breaks damn near non-stop during operations. Units used to have a very robust prescribed load list (PLL--an inventory of spare parts maintained at the unit level), but over the past ten years the PLL has been whittled down to almost nothing. That means that when a vehicle breaks down, instead of pulling a part out of the back of a five ton truck, you've got to order it from the forward support battalion, who may have to order it from the division support battalion...bottom line, we end up waiting longer to fix things because the parts aren't readily available.

TO: Andrew Olmsted
RE: Just In Time Logistics!!!?!?!

Those miserable f---s are trying to use JITL??!!?! Crap!

I thought we did that one to death in LEDC '92. We had a bunch of vets from GWI going through and all of them, as well as myself thought that was the dumbest idea in the whole freaking world.

Try getting logistical support "just in time" when you're surrounded.

Regards,

Chuck(le)

It seems that everyone, including me, to an extent has gotten caught up in the attempt by the newsmedia to report on this war like it was a basketball game.

There are many things different but some perspective is called for - Granada took 8 days to subdue. My father went 6 weeks without a hot meal or a shower during the period they were trying to overcome the Germans during the Battle of the Bulge. This thing is only just beginning.

I don't know how anybody could not realize that the OB was not entirely in Kuwait when the opening bell rang. And I don't know how anyone should expect that we would publish our OB and its timetable for deployment for CNN or the BBC to broadcast.

A good guess for the heaviest fighting should be 6 weeks at a minimum. Maybe that much again to eliminate the real dead enders. After all, it would seem that they should be able to hold out at least as twice as long as the French did at the beginning of WWII.

It wont be too much longer, as pointed out in this aritcle on slate, now that R.W. "Johnny" Apple sez were screwed, you can set the timer on your "victory watch":

http://slate.msn.com/id/2080772/

best line in the piece:

"Ridiculing Apple is easy—he's a large, slow target that bleeds profusely when hit. But many others in the press are guilty of Appleism, writing whatever story is required to fit the arc of the wartime news cycle"

Kudos to you VP for having the balls to admit you were wrong.

Rumsfeld's comment at the press conference today that the plan that's being implemented was Franks' plan is a nice cya move. Check out this link
http://www.govexec.com/dailyfed/0303/032803nj1.htm

Chuck,

I've never found anyone who thinks the PLL reductions were a good idea, but they happened, nonetheless. Money, don't you know? Dropping PLL levels to basically zero saved the Army money, and that's what it was all about in the 90s. Now it's the standard, with predictable results.

Stephen,

Thanks for the very honest post here. I readily admit I am not a fan of Rumsfeld and his staff, and while I think they have made some strategic mistakes so far, they are fortunate that the tactical skills of GEN Franks and LTG Wallace are proving to be the difference so far. These two outstanding leaders have proven why generals lead troops in battles and not civilian policy makers. The battles have not gone as the war gaming predicted, but great generals know how to be flexible and react correctly to what is presented on the battlefield.

I think avoiding too many US military and Iraqi civilian casualties is what is going to extend the conflict more that anything. In the end this will prove why America is a great and benevolent country. Had we acted as a "warrior" nation we would have leveled Basra and Baghdad with a couple of MOABS in a WW II-like "shock and awe" (ie Dresden, Tokyo, Hiroshima, Nagasaki) and this war would be over now. But that is insane and goes against everything we believe in now.

So take heart, sir. Your predictions may have been off, and you--like Rumsfeld et al.--may be guilty of slight overconfidence, but so what? Your faith in our men and women at arms to win this war is what matters most, and on that you have been so very correct.

I admit I was against going to war before it started, but now that it has started I want us to win as badly as anyone. But I want us to win with our integrity intact, to not become barbarians in the name of expediency.

I think we have no idea what is actually going on, the that the military is actively using the media to mislead Saddam and his forces.

Rumsfeld is also willing to take the short term media hit instead of compromising information or, quite possibly, overplaying our successes.

Remember how the "Highway of Death" went over during the Gulf War? Wanna bet what that Republican Guard armored column that was moving south of Baghdad looks like now? Yeah.

Rumsfelds game face notwithstanding, all of the "experts" are saying that the 4th and others are badly needed right now.

Since there seem to be plenty of "experts" here (as good as any I've heard), I'm wondering: What are the realistic expectations for getting the 4th functioning in Iraq?

That could mean covering supply lines, getting into the "red zone", any of it. Just curious.

Thanks in advance.

Well, now that we see where 3ID's mad dash has taken them, a 12,000 ft. airstrip, things are making more sense.

That long of an airstrip ringed with arty. on Baghdad's doorstep is a very nice place to be while you get the rest of the pieces in place to assault the city.

I don't agree with Steve on the Rumsfeld assessment (that more combat troops were needed before this should have started).

Please correct me if I'm wrong here.

Let's say that the number of combat troops should have been doubled. How much extra time would that have required? 2 weeks? Another month?

That would have also give Saddam even more time to get ready. Maybe to blow up half of all the oil wells in Southern Iraq (instead of

Assuming that Turkey remained out of play. Would the extra troops have helped in Basra? Nasiriya? The harassment by irregulars would still happen. And I do not believe that US forces would be any more likely to get into urban combat in Basra and Nasiriya because they'd have more troops.

If the extra troops were there, how would they have made this any easier?

So much has been accomplished in a short time. More troops are on the way. And Saddam has been clearly knocked back.

All the talking heads (particularly the military consultants) complain more troops and tanks were needed. But that's a motherhood statement.

There was a time element involved (attack before your opponent is fully ready), and I don't think that the casulties suffered so far would have been that much different from waiting for another 2 - 4 weeks.

The plan still looks good, and is adapting.

The only setback (for now) is the fear of the Iraqi people to rise up. They have survived long enough and want to be sure the US/UK finish the job this time.

Don't be so quick to blame Rumsfeld

Apparently, US strategists didn't plan for the anti-occupation mentality that could possess as many as 20% of Iraqis. The Fedayen appear to be inspired by the Arab-Paleos.

I would question long term American indulgence of an intifada plagued occupation. Perhaps the execution of the entire Fedayen movement, for war crimes, is the necessary step to pacifying Iraq.

Mass execution is repugnant to the Western mind. But it will become thinkable.

So many informed opinions, all better grounded than those found in the NYT. It makes me timid to throw mine out, but what the hell, because I am of course talking about "l'audace, l'audace, toujours l'audace."

We went for the golden bullet and almost made it. If we had gotten Saddam and his whole crew our Jacksonian charge might've rattled the Iraqi leadership to collapse. Such is war.

Back to Plan B (Plan A scuttled with Turkey). Whatever time in days is needed for refit and rest will not be idle with air power and tubes pounding all available targets into dust. We have cut Iraq in half, meaning all the screamin' meemies playing the Somali game can do nothing but die without any support or reinforcements. Their tactics were suited for light infantry in Mogadishu, against armor on the desert plain they are vaporizing. We should consolidate our rear areas and get into Basra, as onerous as urban combat is and free that city. Just to shut the media the hell up already (where are the cheers and flowers! they demand) and free those poor folk from the brown shirts.

Time is on our side and maybe we can wait for the 4ID to form up before we shake Baghdad to its millenium foundations. Time will tell, as the other Erik has said wait until there is more of a historical record. Realtime news reporting has a very bad habit of getting things wrong and that's concerning what they think they know.

Heh.

Whatever mistakes we have made cannot be exploited by the Iraqi government.

We tried to get the first prize. We failed. The missile strike was audacious, and we actually achieved short-term surprise in the initial ground assault.

We must secure the south, and begin preparations for an Iraqi Federal Republic to contain Free Kurdistan and the liberated areas of the south.

Providing the Iraqi people a concrete, *IRAQI* alternative to Saddam Hussein must be done. Right now, all we are offering are vague promises. This will also reassure the skittish folks in the south that we will not cut and run as we did in 1991.

The Badr Brigades and the Kurdish peshmurgas must be used to help police areas where fedayeen might operate, both in the north and south.

Saddam will wither on the vine. His reign of terror will end. But we must create an *IRAQI* alternative to solidify the vague promises.

Before everyone goes and attacks Rumsfeld, Please remember that it was his job to challenge, poke, prod, and be a pest to the Generals to keep them from being lazy, stagnant, predictable and inefficient with the resources on hand.

I highly reccommend reading "Supreme Command" by Cohen, a book on the Civil/military relationship that goes into this sort of thing very well.