Funny you should write about this. Nearly two years ago, I read an article written by a crusty old sergeant in the city newspaper about the Army that addressed the same expressed objectives it carries today (which would duly relieve some degree of blame from Rumsfeld's immediate vicinity).

The Army, it seemed, had concluded from their extensive, expensive research that (and I paraphrase), "large, mass-scale conflicts are no more; heavy weaponry and armor are obsolete. Q.E.D." The article went on to describe the Army's reponse to this enlightenment: they'd drop their tanks and artillery and would instead throw their cash into techno-military gizmos and, from the descriptions in the article, what sounded to be like electronics-laden, armed SUVs.

Criminy. What next, "no use of explosives in the future" or a declaration that all combatants would be wearing one-piece, sequined jumpsuits by the year 2075?

Heart in mouth, I showed the article to my coworker, Brian--an ex-Marine. He patiently read the article and then put the newpaper down on a counter, grinning at me:

"Don't worry about it. The Army's only half-effective anyway."

It's funny you should mention that. (Hardware depletion, that is.)

Nearly four years ago now, I read an article by a crusty old Air Force General by the name of "Chuck Horner", who worried about lapses in electronic combat technology in favor of "stealth and cruise missiles."

I note in passing that it was Dick Cheney who presided over a great deal of what happened. I never thought it was a good idea to ditch the EF-111's and F-4G's.

20,50,100,200 years from now, whereever a war is fought, the combatants engaging will need soldiers on the ground willing to cut their enemies throat from a very short distance. The way I see it, as conflicts become more ethnic and primal--which they are, the US will rely more on proxy forces (i.e. Kurds, Northern Alliance, etc.) supplemented with limited amounts of US special forces and Marines. The era of the "big" war is over for the forseeable future. Small amounts of Western troops with huge amounts of firepower from different sources is the future. However, here is the problem: These people are highly skilled and hard to replace.

my sources are navy and marines so biased obviously but they think the Army has been most bloated and victimized by pc. Lower numbers not a concern need is for quality people.

Now, I buy the idea that a smaller, better equiped army is both better, and the direction Rummy is taking them, but I still really like the idea of having a big hulking troop heavy ground force to fall back on.

"Low Intensity Conflict" was the buzzword for years ... then the Gulf War arrived.

Basically, each time someone heralds the end of one kind of war, it returns sooner or later. And then the other kind of war is declared "over".

>I note in passing that it was Dick Cheney
>who presided over a great deal of what
>happened. I never thought it was a good >idea to ditch the EF-111's and F-4G's.

This had nothing to do with Cheney and everything to do with the USAF Fighter Pilot Mafia killing the F4G/EF111 force structure so they could keep a wing of F15's as place holders for the F22.

Steve,

There are four books you need to read in order to have a background on the Rummie-US Army war.

Book #1:

WAGING MODERN WAR by Gen. Wesley Clark, which lays out the extent of current Army Brass insubordination visa vi civilian authority.

Book #2:

WAR IN TIME OF PEACE, Bush, Clinton and the Generals, by David Halberstam, which reflects and gives the history of where this culture of insubordination began. Collen Powell palys a very significant part in this affair.

Book #3:

THE SAVAGE WARS OF PEACE: Small Wars and the Rise of American Power, by Max Boot, which shows that the American military did indeed "deliver the pizza" and a whole bunch of other things the Vietnam generation of officers says we should not do with the military.

Book #4

SUPREME COMAND: Soldiers, Statesmen and Leadership in Wartime, by Elliot Cohen, which shows the relationship of various military high commands with their elected democratic leaders in time of war. Licoln would be very familiar with the games Collen Powell and his Brass "mind children" have played with the last three Presidents.

First of all, the army was right to be concerned about US operations in Kosovo & Bosnia. They tie up large numbers of troops
in patrolling areas that make the Middle East, like Mayberry. Besides. Ol' Wes, might
ahve got us into a shooting war with the Russians; and how much damage would that
have caused

Second, Halberstam's book is similar afflicted with the focus on Haiti, Bosnia
Somalia, (the underlying aspects of the
Moslem connections to at least two of those
theatres of operation are downplayed) And
he's got this Upper East side NY liberal Vietnam media fixation.

I probably agree most with Max Boot's summary of 19th and 20th century police
actions, and Cohen's treatise on command

>I note in passing that it was Dick Cheney
>who presided over a great deal of what
>happened. I never thought it was a good
>idea to ditch the EF-111's and F-4G's.

This had nothing to do with Cheney and everything to do with the USAF Fighter Pilot Mafia killing the F4G/EF111 force structure so they could keep a wing of F15's as place holders for the F22.

[end cite]

Well, hell, Trent: if SecDef can't get his own troops to fight nice amongst themselves, then what the hell is he good for?

OK, let's be square on the issue of DoD toys.

On the plus side, a reduced human footprint means reduced human risk. Large army units are only useful once the area has been secured. That's right: the "Hundred Hour War" was paid for by months of Air Force and Navy personnel paving the way, some of them dying. Those newfangled flying machines will be up front for as long as possible to avoid Vietnam-style footage of our boys' blood. What is the cost of human life? Is it more than the cost of an airplane? I certainly hope so.

On the down side, there's a way to go before our acquisition system is under control. It's not quite "All My Sons" yet, but I often wonder whether Arthur Miller wrote the script for Bradley development. Becoming too enthralled with toys will cripple us if we lose sight of the mission. Front line troops have to be able to say, "Holy crap, that sucks," and we have to give them something better, rather than the current situation: "Well, that's what we budgeted for six years ago, so you'll just have to make do." The myriad of changes to the F-22 program have all accumlated over the program's 2-decade existence. If service was this proportionally slow at a restaurant, I'd have had to call in my order a month early. We have responsiveness problems.

We _are_ done with the old style of war. Asymmetric warfare, boys & girls: we're the only superpower left standing. Let's just hope that all of these commitments don't lead to a Gulliver--Lilliputian incident.