Is it possible to destroy a totalitarian government, without destroying the host country it feeds on?

In December, 1989, we did just that to Manuel Noriega’s regime in Panama. In Operation Just Cause, the surgical strikes weren’t always so surgical (they never are), and too many civilians were killed (they always are), but in the end, we got Noriega in jail and something akin to a decent government in Panama.

At the very least, they haven’t caused us any grief since then. And that’s about the most one can usually hope in international relations.

Now the Washington Post reports that something similar is being planned at the Pentagon for Saddam Hussein and his Ba’ath regime.

Remember, this is a plan in a building full of them – but it is interesting.

But could we do it?

For starters, Iraq is a much bigger place than Panama. Bigger operations are inherently riskier. More soldiers, longer supply lines, more places for the other guy to hide – it’s just a lot more complicated. We’re talking a multi-division effort here, not a few battalions of paratroopers.

We also knew the ground in Panama much better. By 1989, we’d had soldiers on the ground there for just shy of a century. We built the place practically from scratch. In Iraq, we haven’t had inspectors for four years, or (officially, anyway) ground troops for a decade.

The Ba’ath Party isn’t Noriega’s hired thugs; it’s a real, pan-Arab nationalist movement. It has deep roots in the Sunni center of Iraq, and even in neighboring Syria. If Saddam can re-wed himself to Ba’athism, it’s possible he could drum up genuine popular support. Unlikely, but possible.

Iraq has been preparing for something like this for years. Saddam isn’t the rational actor some like to claim he is, but he’s a much smarter psychopathic thug than Noriega ever was – and Saddam has had a lot more time to dig his bunkers a lot deeper. We moved on Panama within months of the first trouble. We’ve been dicking around with Saddam now since the 1991 ceasefire agreement.

Finally, Saddam has lots of bugs and chemicals to hit us and our Israeli allies with. MOPP gear – the stuff soldiers have to wear to fend off the nasties – is not only beastly to wear, it also reduces your vision and slows down your optempo. The cure ain’t as bad as the disease, but it’s still a big hassle.

So our negatives include the inherent risks of a big operation, worse intelligence, a possible nationalist movement, a better prepared enemy, and having to face chemical or biological weapons.

What are our plusses?

The United States Armed Forces are uniquely well-suited to complex operations. From 7,000 miles away, we swatted down an enemy regime in a matter of weeks. And we did this to Afghanistan without the typically-required benefits of having pre-positioned equipment or formations, or even any infrastructure to speak of. And we did it both imaginatively and on a shoestring budget (in terms of money and stuff and men).

“Anything you can see, you can hit,” goes the old Army mantra. It concludes with, “Anything you can hit, you can kill.” Let Saddam dig his bunkers. We can find them – and the rest will follow as naturally as a well-aimed blast follows a JDAM.

Just Cause saw the first-ever use of the F-117A Nighthawk “stealth fighter” (really a tactical bomber) in action. Both stealth and precision munitions were new to us. Since then, we’ve had 13 years of near-constant action to refine our doctrines for both. And the precision munitions have gotten more precise. And we have more of them. And we can even use them off old-fashioned planes like the B-52. And we’ve added the B-2 Spirit bomber to the inventory.

Saddam’s armies don’t want to fight. The regular army, what’s left of it, remembers two things from 1991: Saddam left them out for slaughter, and Saddam left them out for slaughter. Even if they would fight for him, they can’t – they’ve been stripped of anything more complicated than small arms. As for the Republican Guard, they represent what little political ambition still exists in Iraq – and they’d like to keep it that way. Really, don’t expect anyone outside of Saddam’s Special Republican Guard Baghdad division to put up a fight.

Finally, don’t underestimate the power of the fact that we’re the good guys. The people of Iraq might despise us for a military defeat and a decade of deprivation – but they know we’re still better than what they have now. While we might not be welcomed in like we were in Italy 60 years ago, there will be no great groundswell of popular support for Saddam.

In short? Yeah, you’re damn right it could work.